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This paper argues monetary union stability requires a government banker that manages 
the bond market and it offers a specific proposal for stabilizing the euro that does not 
violate the “no country bail-out” clause. There is accumulating evidence that the euro’s 
current architecture is unstable. The source of instability is high interest rates on highly 
indebted countries which creates unsustainable debt burdens.  Remedying this problem 
requires a central bank that acts as government banker and pushes down government 
bond interest rates to sustainable levels. That can be accomplished by creation of a 
European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European 
Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade.  
 
The debate over the euro’s financial architecture also has significant political 
implications. That is because the current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes 
a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments 
under continuous financial pressures. Over time, that pressure makes it difficult to 
maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for 
reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform. 
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  The financial crisis of 2008 began as a private sector financial crisis. However, in 
many countries it has morphed into a public sector financial crisis owing to large budget 
deficits caused by reduced tax revenues, temporary fiscal stimulus, and large bailouts of 
the financial sector, combined with long-standing adverse trends in public debt-GDP 
ratios.  
  The crisis has raised a host of issues regarding the merits of fiscal policy and the 
limits to debt financed budget deficits. In Europe, it has raised another issue regarding 
fiscal policy and monetary unions. The standard argument (Kenen, 1969; De Grauwe, 
1994) is that monetary unions (especially non-optimal currency unions) need a system of 
fiscal transfers. That is because regions are likely to be hit by asymmetric shocks and 
those shocks can be softened by inter-regional transfers which substitute for capital and 
labor mobility. Europe lacks such a system and euro skeptics therefore claim it needs to 
establish one or else some member countries may be compelled to exit the euro. 
  The current paper offers another interpretation of the euro’s monetary union 
problem, which is that it lacks a government banker. The euro solved Europe’s problem 
of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency with a single exchange rate 
managed by the European Central Bank (ECB). However, in doing so, it replaced the 
exchange rate speculation problem with a bond market speculation problem. That is 
because countries lost their national central banks able to issue money and assist in 
managing interest rates and financing government. 
  The paper argues that this flaw in the euro’s structural architecture can be 
remedied by the creation of a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that would 3 
 
have the discretionary powers to issue bonds that would be jointly and severally backed 
by euro zone member countries. In effect, the EPFA would function as the public finance 
sibling of the ECB which manages monetary conditions. 
Neoliberal economics and the euro’s design 
  The euro was created in an era of neoliberal political and intellectual dominance. 
Neoliberal political theory argues for diminishing the role of the state and enhancing the 
power of the market, and within monetary theory this is expressed by claims that: 
(1) Fiscal policy is ineffective. 
(2) Money is neutral and the only effect of money growth is inflation. 
(3) The real economy quickly and automatically returns to full employment in response 
to negative demand shocks. 
  These theoretical claims shaped the euro’s design and are reflected in both the 
legal arrangements governing the ECB and ECB policy. The essential feature was a 
change in the monetary – fiscal balance that followed from prohibiting central bank 
involvement with public finances.  
  Under the old system of national money central banks played a key role helping 
manage the public debt, finance budget deficits, and finance rescues of the financial 
sector. The euro’s architecture undermined this government banker function by stripping 
national central banks of ability to issue means of payment. That has contributed to the 
public debt crisis centered on the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) 
countries. In contrast, the U.S. and U.K. have been able to use the Federal Reserve and 
Bank of England to push interest rates to near zero, help finance private sector financial 
bailouts, and engage in quantitative easing bond purchases that have helped finance 4 
 
budget deficits at rock bottom interest rates. For the U.S. and U.K., that has lowered the 
budget cost of the crisis and helped avoid a public debt crisis of confidence.  
  In effect, national monetary systems make national governments master of the 
bond market, whereas the euro’s architecture makes the bond market master of national 
governments. Given the dominance of neoliberal economic thinking, this was an intended 
outcome of the euro’s design. 
  Figure 1 shows alternative monetary – fiscal institutional structures. The 
government budget can be “unrestricted” or subject to “deficit rules”. The central bank 
can play the role of “government banker” or it can be “detached”. The concept of 
detached captures a situation where the central bank is unconnected to government. The 
critical feature is the central bank is not allowed to buy government debt, which makes 
the concept of a detached central bank qualitatively different from the concept of central 
bank independence. The latter corresponds to a situation in which government distances 
itself from central bank decision making but central banks are allowed to purchase 
government debt.   
























  The modern era of pure fiat money (i.e. the era since the end of the gold standard 
in the 1930s) has been characterized by the combination “unrestricted deficits – 
government banker”, which corresponds to the current U.S. and U.K. arrangements. In 
recent years governments, including the U.K., have allowed central banks to become 
more independent but they are not detached.  
  Within the U.S. there has been a long-standing push to impose budget rules in the 
form of a balanced budget requirement, which would push the U.S. into the north-east 
quadrant. The south-east quadrant of deficit rules and detached central bank effectively 
constitutes the situation of many U.S. states which have no central bank and are subject 
to balanced budget requirements. The south-east quadrant also captures the formal 
situation of euro zone member countries. Within these countries the formal shells of 
central banks remain, but they are now regulatory agencies rather than central banks that 
issue means of payment. Along with this, the Maastricht Treaty imposes a budget deficit 
rule allowing countries average budget deficits of up to three percent of GDP. However, 
the current crisis has proved so serious that the Maastricht Treaty budget deficit 
provisions have essentially been ignored and euro zone countries have been allowed to 
ignore budget rules, placing them in the south-west quadrant. 
Detached central banks and the problem of bond market instability 
  Though euro countries have been allowed (at least for the moment) to ignore 
budget rules, they are still subject to monetary governance via a detached central bank. 
The problem with such governance is central banks are prohibited from buying 
government debt, leaving government bond markets open to speculative attack. In effect, 6 
 
the euro solved the problem of exchange rate speculation and replaced it with the 
problem of bond market speculation. 
  The problem of bond market speculation can be captured by following simple 
model. Government bond investors in euro countries aim to earn a risk adjusted expected 
return equal to that which they could earn on safe bonds, implying the following 
condition 
(1) 1 + i
* + z = E(R)  
where i
* = safe bond interest rate, z = risk premium required for investing in a country’s 
bonds, and E(R) = expected return to investing in a country’s bonds. The expected return 
to individual euro country bonds is given by 
                      -  - -      -         +    
(2) E(R) = p(Y(d(i,..),i,..),iD/Y(d(i),i,...),Z)X + [1 – p(Y(d(i), i,..),iD/Y(d(i),i,...),Z)][1+i]      
     
 where p(.) = probability of default, i = country interest rate, d = budget surplus/deficit, D 
= debt-to-GDP ratio, Z = confidence variable, and X = payment in default state. The 
probability of default is such that 0 < p < 1, and the default payment is such that 0 < X < 
1.  
  Signs above functional arguments represent assumed signs of partial derivatives. 
An increase in the country interest rate directly increases the probability of default by 
increasing the government’s debt service burden (iD). However, there are conflicting 
effects on Y. On one hand a higher interest rate directly lowers private sector demand. 
But balanced against this there is a positive demand effect from higher interest payments 
that works via the budget deficit since interest payments are transfer payments. 
  The model is closed by adding a dynamic interest rate adjustment mechanism 
given by 7 
 
(3) di/dt = f(1 + i* + z – E(R))                        f(0) = 0, f’ > 0, f” > 0 
If the risk adjusted return on safe bonds exceeds the expected return on a country’s 
bonds, the country bond interest rate rises as agents sell the country’s bonds to buy safe 
bonds.  
  Equation (2), describing the expected return function, is the critical equation. This 
expected return function can be volatile due to shifts of confidence (Z) and also non-
linear with respect to the country bond interest rate. The economic logic of non-linearity 
is because of competing effects. On one hand a higher domestic interest rate raises the 
expected return on a country’s bonds. However, higher interest rates can also reduce the 
expected return due to increased default risk from higher debt service burdens and 
adverse impacts on income. Consequently, depending on the sensitivity of the p function 
and the sensitivity of Y to increases in i the slope of the ER function can change signs.  
  Figure 2 provides a graphical analogue of the model in which there are four 
equilibrium points. Equilibrium A is the stable “good” equilibrium with low interest 
rates. Equilibrium B is the unstable low interest rate equilibrium. Equilibrium C is the 
stable “bad” equilibrium with high interest rates, and equilibrium D is the unstable high 
interest rate equilibrium. PIIGS countries can be thought of as trapped in the bad high 
interest rate equilibrium given by C or D. The policy challenge is to move them to A. 8 
 





Country bond rate, i
 
  In the context of the euro zone the safe bond interest rate, i
*, can be identified 
with the interest rate on German bunds. Given that Germany is the strongest and largest 
euro zone economy, bunds are regarded as the safest bond. To a degree, as with money 
(Menger, 1892), there may even be an element of self-fulfilling prophecy. Having 
become the standard of safety, money flocks to that safe standard thereby increasing the 
liquidity of bunds and further driving down the German interest rate. That improves 
Germany’s fiscal situation, which further increases the perceived safety of bunds. By 
becoming the safe standard, Germany gets to enjoy a premium ranking and a form of 
bond ranking seignorage. 
  The multiple equilibrium character of the model means it may exhibit hysteresis. 
For instance, suppose financial panic causes a sudden jump in the risk premium, z. In this 
event country bond rates may jump from the low interest rate good equilibrium at A to 
the high interest rate bad equilibrium at C or D. However, once the panic is over and the 9 
 
risk premium drops back a country can remain trapped in the high interest rate 
equilibrium.  
  A similar outcome can occur if there is a sudden deterioration in confidence (Z) 
about future conditions in country economies. In this event, the E(R) function shifts 
down. If the downward shift is large enough the country domestic interest rate may jump 
to the bad high interest rate equilibrium where it can remain stuck. That is because high 
interest rates create a self-fulfilling prophecy of increased likelihood of default, which 
means investors demand high interest rates to compensate for that increased risk.   
  The flaw in the system is that a government under speculative attack cannot use 
its central bank to intervene in the bond market and reduce the stock of outstanding debt. 
Without a central bank, governments are reduced to the same bond market standing as 
provinces and large corporations. That opens them to speculation, the vagaries of market 
discipline, and runs on debt just like any other borrower.  
  The euro’s constitution prohibits the ECB from intervening to protect national 
government bonds. That prohibition is justified as the ECB should not give special 
treatment and intervention subsidies to individual countries as that could establish 
dangerous incentives. Countries would have an incentive to engage in populist fiscal 
policy, with low taxes and large budget deficits, knowing the ECB would come to their 
rescue. With all countries subject to the political pull of such behavior, that would 
generate monetary instability. 
A new European public finance architecture 
  The problem in the euro’s architecture is that there is no institution to defend 
national bond markets. That restricts governments’ ability to make optimal use of deficit 10 
 
financing and it also exposes national bond markets to bond market vigilante discipline. 
This flaw can be remedied by creating a new public finance architecture that includes a 
European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) which would issue European bonds jointly 
and severally backed by all member countries. The critical feature of this proposal is the 
ECB would have the right to buy and sell EPFA bonds.  
  The proposed public finance architecture consists of three pillars and is illustrated 
in Figure 3. First, countries would retain the right to issue their own sovereign bonds that 
they alone back. These national bonds would be analogous to U.S. state and municipal 
bonds. They would be also subject to some form of sovereign debt default process that 
could be invoked in situations of extreme national financial distress, but EPFA bonds 
would be excluded. A sovereign default mechanism of this sort has been proposed by 
Gianviti et al. (2010). This default process would be similar to the Chapter 9 provision in 
U.S. bankruptcy law governing default by states and municipalities. With markets aware 
ex-ante of this possibility, standard bond market discipline would apply to this portion of 
the public finance architecture. 
Figure 3. The proposed new euro zone public finance 
architecture.
Public finance architecture
National sovereign bond 









  Second, euro zone member countries would create an EPFA that would issue 
jointly and severally backed bonds and operate as follows. (1) The authority would be 
able to sell new bonds of all maturities at its discretion. (2) Bond sale proceeds would be 
paid over to national governments. (3) The ECB would have the right to buy and sell 
already issued EPFA bonds. (4) EPFA would be governed by finance ministers of euro 
zone member countries, representing their national governments. (5) Voting rights within 
EPFA would be allocated across countries on a per capita basis. (6) Distribution of bond 
sale proceeds would also be on a per capita basis, as would countries’ obligation to pay 
debt interest on EPFA bonds. In effect EPFA would serve as a trust entity with regard to 
EPFA bond issues, receiving interest service from countries and distributing those 
payments to bond holders. 
  The third pillar of the public finance architecture would have EPFA oversee a 
European sovereign bail-out fund that could make emergency loans to member countries. 
This fund would be financed by sale of EPFA bonds. The important feature is access to 
the fund would be subject to economic policy conditionality imposed by EPFA. In effect, 
the fund would be a form of European IMF (Palley, 2010; Gros and Mayer, 2010). In the 
current crisis Greece has turned to the IMF for emergency financing. That has been a 
mistake. At the political level it diminishes the global standing of the euro. At the 
economic level, it is unnecessary. The IMF cannot produce euros, which are only 
produced by the euro zone monetary system. Consequently, Europe can organize its own 
bailouts without recourse to the IMF. Indeed, interest payments on IMF loans are form of 
tax leakage out of the European economy and are therefore bad at a time of demand 
shortage. 12 
 
  There are several important features of the proposed EPFA. First, and most 
importantly, it creates a European bond without any trace of national identity. That bond 
can therefore be legitimately traded by the ECB without violating the “no bail-out of 
countries” clause, which in turn creates space for open market operations. Consequently, 
the ECB can take on the role of government banker for Europe, a feature that is missing 
in the current institutional design.  
  Second, EPFA would be able to help finance annual budget deficits for countries 
via annual bond issues that could vary with the state of the overall Euro zone economy. 
All member countries would receive payments on a per capita basis. Countries that 
received payments in excess of their own needs could retire their own sovereign debt or 
build up a sovereign wealth fund by acquiring the national debt of other countries. 
  Third, there would be a small element of fiscal transfer via population growth 
because of the per capita formulation. Slow growing population countries would tend to 
see their debt obligation fall over time, while fast growing population countries would see 
their debt obligation rise. Germany is a slow growing population country and would 
therefore benefit from this. However, it would effectively be lending its credit worthiness 
to others to bring down their cost of credit so that these countries would still be individual 
beneficiaries. Moreover, the overall euro zone economy would also benefit by the 
strengthening of public finances. 
  Fourth, the EPFA would advance the political project of a democratic federal 
Europe, which is also widely viewed as being part of the core justification for the euro. It 
would be democratic because people of all countries would be treated equally via the 
EPFA voting structure, and it would be federal because of its unified frame that applies to 13 
 
all. As noted by Nutti(2011), a full system of fiscal federalism, with fiscal transfers 
between countries, might evolve later. However, that is a separate decision that would 
rest on the evolution of political sentiments within euro zone countries.  
Policy conduct in an ECB – EPFA system 
  An ECB – EPFA system would create a euro zone policy architecture similar to 
that enjoyed by the U.S. and U.K. The ECB, like the Federal Reserve and Bank of 
England, would be responsible for monetary matters, including interest rate policy. It 
would also retain responsibility for exchange rates. The EPFA would have responsibility 
for issuing euro zone bonds. Since all proceeds from bond sales would be paid to national 
governments, spending decisions would remain entirely in the hands of government. 
  The critical innovation is the ECB would be allowed to buy and resell EPFA 
bonds at its discretion as part of its normal management of monetary conditions. It would 
therefore be able to conduct open market operations, something it rightly cannot do with 
individual country bonds. Moreover, it would be able to conduct OMO’s across the entire 
EPFA maturity spectrum, thereby affecting the term structure of interest rates.  
  Figure 4 shows the major monetary responsibilities envisioned for the ECB under 
the new architecture. The first responsibility would be exchange rate policy regarding the 
euro. The second responsibility would be euro zone interest rate policy.  In addition to 
being able to set the ultra-short overnight interest rate via its Lombard lending facility, 
the ECB would be able to conduct interventions along the entire term structure of EPFA 
bonds. In emergency situations it could also undertake quantitative easing actions. EPFA 
bonds would essentially determine the risk free interest rate for the euro zone and all 
other bonds, including euro zone country sovereign bonds, would price off them. This is 14 
 
exactly how the U.S. monetary system operates. The third responsibility would be a 
facility providing emergency liquidity to the private financial sector. This would be 
analogous to the type of lending facilities the Federal Reserve established in the heat of 
the financial crisis of 2008-09. 















  A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 shows symmetry between the proposed EPFA 
and the ECB. The EPFA would essentially manage public finances, issuing European 
bonds and providing a sovereign emergency financing facility. The ECB would manage 
interest rates, and as part of that responsibility it would play the role of Europe’s 
government banker. It would also provide an emergency financing facility for the private 
financial sector. 
  As part of this system it would be desirable for policy coordination between the 
ECB and EPFA as public finance policy and monetary policy should work together. 
Thus, EPFA willingness to help finance country budget deficits should be contingent on 
the ECB’s assessment of monetary policy needs, and vice-versa.  15 
 
  A major strength of the proposed architecture is it has no arbitrary restraints such 
as the Maastricht Treaty’s three percent budget deficit limit. Those restraints have been 
extremely politically unpopular as they are seen as undermining sovereignty and the 
democratic process. Moreover, they have proved impossible to enforce as countries have 
ignored them in times of economic stress. Consequently, they have yielded no benefits 
and only costs. 
  However, some form of constraint is needed or else individual countries will be 
tempted to ignore the debt sustainability implications of their budget policies. The 
proposed architecture imposes restraints at three different levels. First, EPFA bond 
financing would only be available if agreed to by majority voting of finance ministers 
whose countries contain a majority of the euro zone population. Consequently, such a 
process enhances democracy rather than impeding it. Moreover, countries that did not 
support EPFA bond issues could use their proceeds to pay down their own sovereign 
debt. As that debt will carry a higher risk rating than EPFA bonds, they would gain by 
lowering their overall debt service. 
  A second level of restraint would operate via the sovereign bail-out fund. That is 
because countries needing to use the fund would be subject to EPFA imposed policy 
conditionality. That conditionality would again be democratically imposed as it would be 
determined by majority opinion of finance ministers governing EPFA. The third level of 
restraint would be via market discipline operating in the market for individual country 
sovereign bonds. 
  These restraints mean budget discipline would be maintained but without the 
public finance disadvantages of the current system. That system completely separates 16 
 
public finances from central banking by constitutionally barring the ECB from buying 
government debt. Consequently, it reduces national government to having the same bond 
market standing as provinces and corporations, and that is proving disastrous.  
  Once fully in place the EPFA would assist countries with normal budget deficit 
financing. However, there would be an initial transition period in which countries would 
be able to swap national debt for EPFA debt. This transition process would work as 
follows. EPFA would sell bonds and use the proceeds to buy country bonds on a per 
capita basis. Those country bonds would then be cancelled and EPFA member countries 
would be responsible for their per capita share of EPFA debt service. For countries like 
Luxembourg, which has little national debt to be cancelled, the transition process would 
see them credited with EPFA bonds that would offset their excess EPFA debt obligations.   
Comparison to the “Blue” bond proposal 
  Almost twenty years ago, Stuart Holland (1993), an economic adviser to Jacques 
Delors, proposed the idea of “Union” bonds issued by a European Investment Fund as a 
means of transferring member states’ national debt to the European Union. That idea was 
not adopted, but it has recently resurfaced in connection with the euro zone’s public debt 
crisis.
1 De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) propose a common euro bond. Building on that 
proposal, Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010) have recently proposed the idea of “blue” 
bonds that individual euro-zone countries could issue and which would be jointly and 
severally guaranteed by other euro-zone countries. The idea is to enable highly indebted 
member countries to access the better credit rating of financially stronger countries, 
thereby lowering their interest burden and improving their fiscal position. 
                                                            
1 My thanks to Mario Nutti (2011) for making me aware of the connection between Holland’s (1993) 
proposal and current proposals. 17 
 
  Though having some similarities of appearance with the blue bond proposal, the 
current EPFA proposal is in fact fundamentally different. The most fundamental 
difference is that the ECB would able to buy and sell EPFA bonds and therefore manage 
the euro zone term structure of interest rate. Why is it able to do so under the EPFA 
proposal and not under the blue bond proposal? The answer is because EPFA bonds have 
no taint of national identification owing to the bond issuance process that ensures all 
countries receive equal per capita funding. That means ECB purchases of EPFA bonds 
would benefit all countries similarly and would not violate the ECB’s no bail-out clause. 
This contrasts with the blue bond proposal whereby individual countries would decide 
how many blue bonds to issue and blue bonds would retain a national identification tag. 
Consequently, ECB blue bond purchases would benefit the country whose bonds were 
purchased. The blue bond proposal therefore remains stuck in the current system of 
national bonds, the only change being that some part of those bonds would have a 
European guarantee. 
  The second advantage is that EPFA would continuously issue bonds as part of 
assisting euro zone countries with normal budget deficit financing. The goal is to make 
this a normal element of public finance. That contrasts with the blue bond proposal which 
is inspired by the crisis and conceptualized as a crisis measure. For it, the goal is to help 
crisis countries swap existing high yield debt for lower yield debt by giving them partial 
access to Germany’s credit rating. 
  The third advantage of the EPFA proposal is that it does away entirely with 
Maastricht styled restrictions like the three percent deficit rule. Within the EPFA 
proposal, all budget disciplines operate via the EPFA democratic decision making 18 
 
process or via market discipline. Contrastingly, the blue bond proposal would continue 
Maastricht deficit limits and would impose a ceiling (the suggested number is sixty 
percent of GDP) on country’s ability to issue blue bonds.   
  In sum, the EPFA proposal goes beyond the blue bond proposal because it aims to 
reshape the euro’s financial architecture by restoring the role of government banker to the 
central bank. In effect, it fundamentally changes the euro’s architecture by discarding its 
neoliberal design that separates the ECB from public finances. Like the blue bond 
proposal, the proposed EPFA provides debt interest relief to crisis countries by giving 
them access to lower interest European bond credit. However, it also gets rid of 
undemocratic sovereignty violating Maastricht style restrictions and enables the ECB to 
act as government banker and conduct open market operations in EPFA bonds.  
Conclusion 
  This paper has concerned both theory and policy. With regard to theory it is about 
the stability of monetary unions and the need for a government banker that manages the 
bond market. With regard to policy it offers a specific proposal for stabilizing the euro by 
creating a euro zone government banker. 
  There seems to be accumulating evidence that the current architecture of the euro 
is unstable and the euro will likely fall apart unless changes are made. The source of that 
instability is high interest rates on highly indebted countries which creates unsustainable 
debt burdens.  Remedying that problem requires a central bank that acts as government 
banker and pushes down interest rates to sustainable levels. This can be accomplished by 
EPFA.  19 
 
  Analytically, the paper offers a third path for the euro. The current path, which 
includes modifications like the blue bond proposal, aims to continue with the Maastricht 
architecture that imposes numerical restrictions on budget deficits and debts and 
separates the ECB from public finances. A second path is for a fiscal transfer union. The 
third path, proposed by the paper, is for full monetary and public finance union that 
abandons Maastricht style quantitative restrictions but does not include fiscal transfers. 
  The debate over the euro’s financial architecture is not just restricted to 
economics. It also has significant political implications. That is because the current 
neoliberal inspired euro architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the 
central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous additional financial 
pressures. Over time, that pressure is likely to make it difficult to maintain the European 
social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and 
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